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Abstract This essay takes up the work of Bernard Stiegler to evaluate and critique 
his use of Marx and Engels’ notion of proletarianization in the context of new media, 
television, education and activism. The impact of technology and the notion of the 
general intellect is measured against Stiegler’s worry about a ‘short circuit’ that threatens 
humanity and requires a ‘new critique’. Talk of an ‘attention economy’ might be better 
understood if we deploy a wider Marxist notion of proletarianization in relation to class 
consciousness and struggle. Rather than a forlorn complaint about the ‘conspiracy of 
imbeciles’ and the ‘ruin’ of public education, a more careful reading of Marx offers 
proletarianization as a resource in a struggle that is - also but not only - a ‘battle for 
intelligence’.
Keywords proletarianization, cretinization, technology, education, general 
intellect, critique
PROLETARIANISATION
The future of Europe and the world must be thought from the question 
of the psycho-power characteristic of control societies, and whose effects 
have become massive and destructive. Psycho-power is the systematic 
organisation of the capture of attention made possible by the psycho-
technologies that have developed with the radio (1920), with television 
(1950) and with digital technologies (1990), spreading all over the planet.
      Bernard Stiegler1
There is a kind of unseemly scramble underway to cope with apparent 
changes in the technological and social composition of capital today. It is 
my argument that this scramble is symptomatic of a political failure and a 
danger that can be analysed with the help, albeit taken critically, of the work 
of Bernard Stiegler, and of course - as if it were necessary to even say this - 
with Marx. Stiegler’s is an unorthodox Marxism, which is not always a bad 
thing. He diagnoses an ‘indeterminacy rising out of an always-accelerating 
future’ and this opens the space for a ‘battle for intelligence’.2 A key concept 
relevant to this battle is quite an old one - a somewhat expanded notion of 
proletarianisation, building upon Gilbert Simondon’s notion of collective, 
technical and human ‘individuation’,3 but derived initially from comments by 
Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto. Stiegler calls ‘proletarianisation’ 
Marx’s greatest contribution. 
 In the Manifesto, Marx and Engels refer to the way in which the capitalist 
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mode of production forces more and more people into dependency upon 
waged labour and they report how the lower strata of the middle class, ‘the 
small tradespeople, shopkeepers, retired tradesmen generally, handicraftsmen 
and peasants’ are sinking gradually into the proletariat. They explain that 
the ‘diminutive capital’ of these lower strata leaves them unable to compete 
with large scale Industry and this Industry also enforces the passing of 
specialised skills in the face of new methods of production.4 Finally, though 
the teleological trajectory here is not so simple, Marx and Engels stress that 
the rise of a proletarian consciousness and proletarian class interest, opposed 
to the bourgeois class and capital, signals the advent of a political struggle 
to overthrow the bourgeoisie so as to inaugurate a world in which ‘the free 
development of each is the condition for the free development of all’.5
 Stiegler has both a narrower and a more generalised sense of 
proletarianisation than Marx and Engels, and he wants to rethink the 
contemporary situation in which we find our lives saturated by what he 
calls ‘psychotechnologies’ - for which often the shorthand is television and 
Google. It is of course unclear what demarcation lines mark out proletarian 
status or not. For Stiegler, the entire middle class seems to have become 
proletarianised, subject to the power of retentional devices that manage the 
contradictions of capital with ‘cultural control’, ‘consumption’ and which 
produce ’impotence’ and ‘self destructive transgressions [passages à l’acte]’.6 
No doubt most data input jobs qualify as impotence-making - inclusive 
of academics toiling away in the teaching factory - but this designation of 
everyone as proletarian differentiates neither regionally nor historically with 
regard to class composition or cultural character. Nevertheless, focussing 
upon technologies, work and skills, a schematic is given in the Manifesto of 
the Ars Industrialis group, co-founded by Stiegler:
We call proletarianization the process through which an individual or 
collective knowledge, being formalized through a technique, a machine, 
or an apparatus, can escape the individual - who thus loses this 
knowledge which was until then his knowledge. The first definitions of 
proletarianization, emerging from the analyses of Smith as well as Marx, 
made clear that pauperization results in the first place from the loss 
of savoir-faire of workers enslaved to machines, and no longer masters 
of their tools (craftsmen).
In the twentieth century, it was consumers who lost their savoir-vivre 
- replaced by apparatus, such as the television set, which kept children 
‘occupied,’ and by services, such as the television network, which kept 
children ‘occupied’ through the apparatus for televisual reception, but in 
such a way as to create ‘available brain time’. This loss led to a deprivation 
of recognition, sociability, and finally existence, generating the suffering 
of the consumer become miserable.
4. Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels The 
Communist Manifesto, 
Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, (1848) 
1967, p62.
5. Ibid., p70.
6. Bernard Stiegler, 
The Decadence 
of Industrial 
Democracies, Polity 
Press (2004) 2011, 
p4, 35 and 60, 
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  But the intellectual workers of ‘cognitive capitalism’, the functions of 
which are increasingly confined within the parameters of information systems 
the principles of which they are unable to modify - frequently because they 
are unaware of them - are subjected as well to a proletarianization of higher 
cognitive functions where what is lost is that which constitutes the life of 
the spirit as a critical, that is, rational, authority, capable of theoretical self-
formalizing and as such of being self-critical.7 
 
In this updated notion of proletarianisation, the role of television, of children, 
of misery and the place of self-criticism are each foregrounded. Stiegler’s 
contribution has implications that need to be considered in relation to the 
very idea of a global proletariat; it has consequences for evaluation of both 
constraints and openings in technical innovation; it demands attention in 
terms of shifting class relations and communications; and lastly, it requires 
a critical assessment and rethinking of the ways race, gender and concerns 
about resistance play out in different cultural and value formats. This is to 
evaluate the appropriation of Marx for new times, and this paper sets out to 
consider this use, the place of technology, the contexts - so as to prepare the 
ground for questioning of how the global might be taken into account, how 
events and values are marked and measured, just who are the contemporary 
proletariat and how is this expressed, presented, represented, or transmuted 
in reflexive theory-writing. The paper aims to re-examine television and 
education, to think again about youth, family and value, and to consider the 
general intellect over against (or as) that which makes us stupid or impotent 
and subject to a Capital that ruins lives.
TELEVISION
Television has been a long-term interest for Stiegler, and subject of an important 
book with Jacques Derrida, originally video-recorded conversations, called 
Echographies of Television.8 In the third volume of his projected five volume 
series Technics and Time, Stiegler returns to television, somewhat strangely 
critical of Pierre Bourdieu for doing a book of his televised discussions,9 but 
also interestingly offering a number of unfolding code-words for televisual 
forms, placing the ‘industries of communication and information’ at the ‘very 
heart of technical systems for the production of material goods’.10 These code 
words appear as general terms for the convergence of ‘audio-visual industries’ 
or ‘psychotechnologies’ (Decadence, p8), while in Taking Care of Youth and the 
Generations, he worries that:
what parents and educators (when they are themselves mature) patiently, 
slowly, from infancy, year after year pass on as the most valuable things 
civilization has accumulated, the audiovisual industries systematically 
destroy, every day, with the most brutal and vulgar techniques, while 
7. Ars Industrialis, 
Manifesto 2010 
http://arsindustrialis.
org/manifesto-2010, 
accessed 31 October 
2010, my italics.
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and Bernard 
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9. Pierre Bourdieu 
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New York, New 
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Malaise, Stanford, 
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Press (2001) 2011, 
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accusing the family and the education system of disaster. This care-less-ness 
is the primary cause of the extreme attenuation of educational institutions 
as well as the family structure (TC, p72).
Stiegler’s wider concern with emergent technologies responds to this assault 
upon the values of civilisation. I will not yet contest his argument that civilisation 
is being destroyed by television, or that we should despair for a ‘herdish nihilism’ 
where a ‘stupid passivity’ means ‘they [we?] no longer believe in anything, no 
longer want anything, no longer do anything’ (Decadence, p60). At this level the 
hyperbole is clear - with oft-expressed alarm, Stiegler is concerned that when a 
baby sees the TV remote as its first preferred rattle this is a disaster inaugurating 
a battle of ‘incomparable importance’ (TC, p93). A battle for intelligence and 
for attention, this is at first a battle with television, where he ‘does not want to 
say … that you are to think the same as others ... [but] you necessarily watch 
[television] with others, at the same time as others ... [and so] ... television is a 
process that tends to make you conform to an average’.11
 My first point is that this rendering of the problem is alarmist and 
patronising. Stiegler reports, from a quite small sample of relatively obscure 
sources, on the astonishing statistics for television consumption in the ‘lower 
classes’ in England. He marvels that nearly 75 per cent of children between 0 
and 3 years have a television in their bedrooms (TC, p56). This is then linked 
to the likely development of attention deficit disorder and extrapolated globally 
into ‘a global attention deficit disorder’, which, in turn, is ‘transferred to the 
professional adult world as the cognitive overflow syndrome’ (TC, p57). There 
are at least two problems with this: first, even accepting the statistics suggests 
that it is not television that is the trouble here, but parenting and commodity 
abundance; secondly, the wild escalation to alleged cognitive overflow in adults 
is tenuous at best. The extensive television consumption of the class in question 
here - the ‘lower classes’ - is not significantly dissimilar to others, but the alleged 
overload of the professional adult is a questionable thesis in any case. Complaint 
about information gluttony is itself a kind of sales-hype or status claim: ‘I’m so 
busy’. The diagnosis of ‘a regression in intelligence’ is not something we could 
adequately gauge from the admittedly often pseudo-intelligible activities of the 
professional class. The claims here are also undifferentially European, or Euro-
American. This is not to say there are no problems with the technological and 
even televisual domination of large swathes of contemporary life worldwide, but 
ideological scaremongering might be tempered by a wider and more systematic 
evaluation and analysis of how television, or new modalities of capitalism, 
rewires both brain and work, globally.
 There is of course too much of Stiegler’s oeuvre to read if a comprehensive 
assessment is to be made, and among his most provocative arguments is that 
television is also potentially sometimes able, like art and the cinema, to solicit 
deep attention (TC, p85) - as detailed in the conversation with Derrida where 
Derrida says he could be ‘tempted to utilize images in the presentation of 
11. Bernard Stiegler, 
Acting Out, Stanford, 
Stanford University 
Press, (2003) 2009, 
p70, henceforth AO 
in the text.
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knowledge’ and to teach on television so long as he had a 20 hour programme 
and people would have to read in advance.12 Derrida sees this is dangerous 
otherwise, but there are greater dangers. When Stiegler follows Katherine 
Hayles in suggesting that today’s youth are subject to brain modification via 
different media, he then writes as if he and his readers are the last literate 
generation, the last to read books like his book, and the last to care (TC, p19). 
It may be churlish to react by noting that the same was said about comics in 
the 1930s, as well as, in their time, cinema, photography and film. Television 
too was welcomed in apocalyptic tones. 
 What is missing here so far is the question of why this was the case, as well 
as discussion of the stakes of the battle. We need an evaluation of the place 
of capital in this scenario. It is a capital that adapts, modifies its technical 
make-up accordingly, and yet does not, and cannot fully exhaust its workforce 
without anticipating extinction. This is an escalation which, irrationally, tends 
towards exhaustion even as the workforce is transformed and moulded in use, 
with psychotechnologies now refined into microtechnologies, which in turn 
‘have actually begun to modify the very structure of the body, including body 
shape … reproductive - procreative - technologies, as well as the invention 
of new kinds of bodies … genetic modifications, cloning and so on’ (TC, 
p34). Stiegler here refers again especially to ‘cognitive overflow syndrome’, 
which is a ‘process of disaffection and disaffectation through cognitive 
as well as affective saturation’ (TC, p212) - an overwhelming cascade of 
information that assaults and transforms the space of social, and economic, 
life. As if to prove the point, he offers a bewildering array of synonyms for 
this crisis: to take just a few pages from where he leaves us at the end of his 
book Taking Care, we read of ‘disequilibrium’, ‘infantalizing hegemonies of 
various psychopowers’, ‘disindividuation … deformation … destruction’, 
‘catastrophic effects on juvenile consciousness’ and ‘attentional deficits and 
intergenerational problems’ (TC, pp180-191).
 Proletarianisation is here a disaster which fosters mass distraction, or, in 
Marx’s more precise word, a ‘cretinisation’. This is the capture of attention in 
a grinning fascination with commodities that claim each to be different but are 
mass produced, congealed and alienated fetish objects. In Capital, Marx goes 
on to show how the tools, organisation, training methods and socio-economic 
forms of capital produce a mode of production rife with contradictions, that, 
in turn, the proletarians will fight:
the mass of misery, oppression, slavery and degradation grows; but with 
this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly 
increasing in numbers, and trained, united, and organised by the very 
mechanism of the capitalist process of production … the centralization 
of the means of production and the socialization of labour reach a point 
where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. The 
integument bursts asunder.13
12. Derrida and 
Stiegler, op. cit., 
p142.
13. Karl Marx, 
Capital Volume 1, 
Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, (1867) 
1976, p929. 
Integument is a 
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the outer husk or 
membrane of, for 
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into a coat. 
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Stiegler, however, accuses Marx of not understanding consumption (Decadence, 
p64). Yet Stiegler’s own concern remains at the level of the family in 
Taking Care, when the destruction of long-circuits of being means sociality is 
destroyed by way of the loss of inter generational cooperation and through 
‘deterritorialized economic forces (and their programming industries)’ (TC, 
p126).
 Stiegler is arguing that what can be lost to television, audio-visual industries 
and psychotechnology-become-microtechnology, is the imaginative shared 
space of play within the family. This in turn is destroyed to the extent that 
the psychotechnologies of the culture industry take control of transitional 
objects and transitional spaces (TC, p15). That baby rattle as remote carries 
a lot of weight in this argument, although some will say it is not clear that the 
mediated world of psychotechnologies does destroy such transitional spaces 
even if the objects are changed. Is it wise to dismiss the not unproblematic 
yet certainly significant impact of new technologies like Skype and videochat 
to connect absent parents and distant grandparents to internet-savvy kids? 
Even as these technologies are saturated commodities, might we recall the 
significance of mediated relationality in examples of, for instance, radio and 
television shared with mates at a distance, via mix tapes in the past, and via 
Spotify today? Or in the ‘isolated’ teenager finding ways to replicate pop, rock 
and hip-hop poses in the bedroom - a self-formation also ‘at a distance’ but 
not less mediated than face-to-face transindividuation unless one privileges 
the pastoral? Can we really say the contemporary post-Google situation is 
more commodified than the bourgeois family already always was - with all its 
psychotic investments and constraints? Care can also exist, and be lost, at a 
distance. There is both stupification and mechanisation, but it does not follow 
that televisual disconnect is inevitably an arrangement that only belongs to 
capitalism - which itself can be overthrown or sublated.
 In the scramble to make sense of the changes that confront us, Stiegler 
is an interesting voice. I want to be careful not to present his comments 
about civilisation, genetics, body shape and other potentially normative 
formations as merely a defence of the bourgeois family, nor as an attack on 
the culture industry and television in the manner of a warmed-up caricature-
Adorno. A more careful appreciation of what is at stake when accumulated 
civilisational merit is located in family relationships might consider new ways 
in which these values can be articulated without necessarily being coded and 
monetised in ways that Google can cash. The stake here is surely not that the 
traditional domestic and educational forms must be preserved, but that the 
appropriations of those with capital, the exploitation of relations of production 
and the consumptions that valorise those appropriations, might be sufficiently 
and fundamentally opposed. This means asking what it would mean to win 
against a capitalism that happily exploits television, nanotechnology and 
education as teaching factory. It also perhaps means winning against and by 
way of proletarianisation, and through stupidity and machines - stupification 
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and mechanisation - as we shall see.
 Stiegler’s effort to address key problems of the contemporary social and 
political circumstance deserves a careful examination that perhaps looks more 
to continuities than to ruptures. The alleged ‘upheaval’ of communication 
systems and cybernetics might be taken in a less sensationalist mode, not to 
‘ignore or downplay’ the developments entailed, since I agree that ‘the very 
essence of cultures and societies is at stake’ (TT3, p135) but to provoke a 
possibly different reading. A less techno-obsessive approach might claim both 
less and more of proletarianisation, as fear and love of technology equally fall 
under the spell of the ubiquitous commodity system. It may still be necessary 
to question Stiegler’s somewhat circular view that ‘enhancing the points of 
contact and communication devices between and among human groups 
means a tendency to reduce their ability to resist the concretizing process of 
technical tendencies’ (TT3, p135).
 What concerns Stiegler is that the ‘interior milieux’ of social groups are 
captured and dissolved by the ‘exterior milieu’ of the market in a synchronised 
‘radiophonic and televisual … flux’ (TT3, p136). The market, and the forces 
of capital signalled in that word, flux, are crucial contexts, but rather than 
the perpetuation of alarm over television, perhaps we might focus a more 
appropriate alarm upon capital in order to evaluate flux as an emergent and 
different density of the distribution of relationships of production. Like Marx 
thinking of co-operation in the factory, might we not imagine flux not only as 
algorithm for record sales and video hits on Youtube, but as a potential form 
of connectivity for those working collaboratively and politically to organise 
the atomised?
ATTENTION AND EDUCATION
international programming industries substitute for national institutions 
(national education systems) that no longer appear compatible with the 
new imperatives of transmission, as (now) defined by the global industrial 
mnemotechnical system. A true war of minds is at work in this evolution 
(TT3, p146) 
Stiegler talks of evolution and a ‘mutation’ of the global capitalist system and 
calls for a ‘new critique of political economy’.14 One, perhaps overly literary, 
way to renew Marx’s critique is to consider narrative, which is of course also 
relevant to television, new media, and the transformations of family and 
education introduced by the cultural industries. Stiegler perhaps has this 
in mind when valorising the grandparent at play with the child, creating 
long-circuits of transmission that would include the favoured technology of 
the book, the storybook, and storytelling. I want to start this section with the 
warning that, no doubt in some respects like television and Facebook, narrative 
14. Bernard Stiegler, 
For a New Critique 
of Political Economy, 
Cambridge, Polity 
(2009) 2010, pp7-8, 
henceforth FNC in 
the text.
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is pharmacological in that it can both shape minds and educate just as much 
as it may capture and contain thinking. Indeed, in a consequence Stiegler 
perhaps must omit, it may be ineffective, disorganised, and effectively ignored 
by the child: ‘Granny, what big teeth you have!’ Let us note the suggestion 
that audiences can become immune to the charms of a story, can tune in 
and out, and can leave it unresolved, or ‘to be continued’. There is perhaps 
a dialectic here: the distraction of attention may actually be a refined and 
critical inattention.
 Stiegler however is clear that the family scene has been subsumed,15 
and this subsumption proceeds via ‘progressively liquidated life skills in an 
industrial economy based on programming industries’ (TC, p128):
the process of capturing public attention is handled by service industries, 
cultural industries and programs synchronizing individuals’ activities into 
mass behaviors motivated by business plans ... Service industries that utilize 
psychopower no longer sell anything to a population that thus no longer 
needs to pay anything: people, having abdicated their majority without 
being conscious of it, ‘give themselves’ to these industries, or rather, the 
industries capture them as ‘available brain time’ psychopower enterprises 
to sell young adults on the market (TC, p38)
Apart from the fact that we do mostly pay for television, mobile phones, 
Macbooks™, internet connections, printer ink and cinema tickets to see The 
Social Network,16 the capture of - the gift of - available brain-time through 
instruments of psychopower is a crucial concept that relates, almost inversely, 
to the process of proletarianisation as deskilling that comes with the mass 
industrialisation of human ability and capacities. The notion of abstract labour 
power is here generalised, even if it is still unclear if I am really fully involved 
in ceding my brain-time as abstract brainpower calculated as an aggregate of 
labour across the entire social field - if brain-time, attention, or psychopower 
is to be harvested, then we should perhaps then talk of cloud labour in the 
same way we talk of cloud computing.
 There is also the question of the degree to which, outside of the strict wage 
relation, brain-time is more or less constitutive of labour capacity today. Is 
brainpower tapped through unpaid work more than was the case previously 
when it was possible to talk of reproduction, community, morality and nation? 
Admittedly in the European bourgeois family, unwaged supportive, attentive 
and reproductive work was even more exclusively the unpaid work of women; 
community as attention to neighbourliness sustained the social life of the 
workforce; moralism was attentive, whether derived from tabloid media or 
religious precept; and citizenship/nationalism contributed to the coherence 
of a population willing to sacrifice itself for abstract ideas. These are all 
sustaining unwaged contributions to capital that also have their intellectual 
- brain-time - components. It may be that the originality of contemporary 
15. Although 
Stiegler does not 
use Marx’s word 
subsumption, he 
offers a related 
analysis as part of 
his ‘new critique’. 
On subsumption see 
Marx Capital Vol.1, 
op.cit., pp1019-
1045.
16. David Fincher 
(director), The Social 
Network, USA, 2010.
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capitalism, and of the new critique of political economy, consists in being 
able to replace these old terms with the new language of service, culture and 
business plan, which frankly does not seem all that new after all.
 But it is the transformations that are our concern, and among the greatest 
of these in relation to ‘proletarianisation’ is cretinisation, and perhaps the 
theme most relevant for today in the face of widespread cuts to education 
budgets, welfare, migration - international students - libraries, the Arts, 
terms and conditions of work and school/training curriculum content, is the 
retooling of education and knowledge:
Given that, today, mechanized understanding and the schematism of the 
cultural industries have converged, this education system, a product of the 
nineteenth century but inspired by the seventeenth and eighteenth as a 
structure for the interiorization of prostheses constructing the history of 
ideas and knowledge and of the We insofar as universal consciousness 
disseminated national stories - this educational system is itself now 
being questioned within the technical system as it (and, along with it, 
consciousness) transforms into the global mnemotechnical industrial 
system (TT3, p146, emphasis in the original).
It is Stiegler’s argument that ‘the public education systems and training 
programs instituted in the 1880s have been slowly but irresistibly ruined 
by mass media and the programming industries, in particular by television’ 
(TC, p52). This ruination has been a ‘self-labotimisation’, replacing public 
opinion with the audience (TC, p53) as if it were undoing the social contract 
worked out to fit training to capital with an unreasoned and unthought-
through, always-on attention to gadgets and devices, that themselves are 
transforming the way we teach, the place of the University and the School, 
and the very idea of instruction. We might note that computer programs do 
come with manuals, but it is perhaps better to learn how they work intuitively, 
exploring the drop down menus etc.17 Stiegler’s lament however is that 
professors and ‘all those responsible for the transmission of knowledge’ have 
‘become marginal at best’ or ‘completely stripped of their role’ (TT3, p150). 
This belongs to ‘acceleration’18 and a view of ‘school as a kind of playground 
for babysitting’ (TT3, p150). In this fairy tale, the professor is a ‘perpetual 
student’ (TT3, p149), trapped in a Peter Pan scenario. In actuality, it is not 
‘only educational institutions that can provide historical consciousness to 
collective consciousness’ (TT3, p147, emphasis in the original). Here the 
danger is of producing a fantasy vanguardism without a vanguard, or Party, to 
accompany a Kantianism without transcendental subject - in the end an echo 
of mechanised rote learning when things are, we may hope, more complicated.
 The analysis of why education has a place as pharmaka is well known. ‘The 
power exercised by the programming industries’ psychotechnologies today 
ruins all the benefits of [the] revolution of (inherited) intelligence’ accelerated 
17. RTFM = ‘read 
the fucking manual’, 
thanks to Steve 
Nugent.
18. Ibid., p151. 
I have made a 
critique of speed 
hype in the Derrida 
chapters of my Bad 
Marxism: Capitalism 
and Cultural Studies, 
London, Pluto Press, 
2004.
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by industrialisation and its need to elevate the population through public 
education (TC, p60). No doubt this is an astute interpretation of the ways 
education is tied through printing - as tertiary retention, explained below - to 
the industrial-commercial system, but the argument of ‘ruination’ sounds 
strangely familiar from elite educational circles in the UK. Lamentations 
that the kids don’t pay attention anymore, that standards have slipped, of a 
lack of respect for elders and a general shallowness of culture is an attitude 
that usually does not need references to Ancient Greece or children’s fantasy 
to back it up. The ‘ruination’ thesis also sounds familiar in that it ascribes 
power to the technologies themselves, rather than the uses made of them. 
Marketisation of technology requires a market structure that was the core 
material component of industrial training. Marx’s comments on training in 
chapter 16 of Capital seem highly relevant here, as we will soon see. 
 For Stiegler, the key problem is the ‘ruining of all sense of responsibility’ 
(TC, p53), lost through television’s destruction of the ways we foster attention 
through inter-generational relations. However much I agree this is a part 
of the equation, I am sceptical that the schools, once called ideological 
state apparatuses for good reason, are the last bastion in a struggle against 
entrapment by Microsoft and the like. Even though there are grounds 
on which to oppose monopoly, the blanket condemnation does not seem 
warranted, television is condemned where, for example, the failure of left 
organisation should perhaps also be the focus - why is the Left so bad at 
TV? As Stiegler has also said, not every capture of attention need be a short-
circuit. Since when did a progressive politics think that the systems of public 
opinion formation that emerged from hierarchical education, especially in 
France for example, were not something with which to do away? Even if the 
violence of television, programming and education may be excessive, a new 
equilibrium seems optimistic - the ‘disequilibrium’ of the ‘reign of television’ 
for Stiegler ‘tends to diminish everything that might be elevated, crushing 
and literally wiping out all other social organisation of transmission and, of 
course, first of all the family and the school’ (Decadence, p47). Yet it is not only 
turning off the TV and going back to school that will save us, and it should 
be underscored that this is not all that Stiegler recommends.
 When television replaces literacy, Stiegler’s model of writing appears 
both more detailed and narrower than that of his mentor Derrida. This 
has profound implications when he describes post-WW2 audio-visual 
programming as having retooled the educational developmental disciplinary 
structure of the schools. The consequent ‘psychological, affective, cultural, 
economic and social disaster’(TC, p58) has introduced inter-generational 
disconnect, insecurity and delinquency as well as the marketing-driven 
removal of youth from the educational system so as to adapt them for 
immediate market needs. Here the valorisation of a European education is 
posited in association with both writing and French colonialism - unfortunately 
not yet taking into account the experience of, and research upon, the colonial 
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subjects who also received that literacy and education. This dictates a closer 
inspection of Stiegler’s notion of writing as grammatisation.
MACHINE GRAMMAR
In this context, we can think of writing as a technology which breaks the flow 
of language into discrete elements. This too has a close relation to the idea 
of proletarianisation where ‘discretisation’ invades the gestures of workers 
and these are grammafied for automatic production in the machine. As we 
have seen, one component of Marx and Engels’ notion of proletarianisation 
is that it entails a process of losing knowledge and production skills during 
their incorporation into the machines of industrial production. For Stiegler, 
this entails the proletarianisation of participation in the technical history of 
memory, a ‘grammatisation’ process that is situated between an amnesic and 
hypomnesic memory, that leaves the individual abstracted or alienated from 
the milieu of technical apparatuses that shape memory, indeed being. The 
machine works the worker, as Marx would say over and over - the worker 
is an ‘appendage’.19 But now, the machine is the individual, in a kind of 
‘short-circuit’ (TC, p38) of the workers who have together developed and 
innovated the technical milieu of their work, tools and systems. The creative 
agents of the milieu become the subjects of it, even objects. Within a system 
of tools and knowledges, workers become machinery with a cost, including 
cost of maintenance, repair and scrapping, that is separated from any self-
constituting grasp. This occurs at all levels of the social order.
 Stiegler then makes an important intervention suggesting that it is not just 
knowledge and skills but thinking that has been smashed. We have been made 
to un-think by separations, dissociation, grammar. This might be reformulated 
in Marxist phrasing as the machines think us – the General Intellect becomes 
an oppressive collective will, alienated from us - which of course we need to 
sublate. But Stiegler does not concede this to Marx, and says ‘Marx still does not 
properly analyze the accumulation of intellectual capital that has today become 
an essential issue, and more generally he ignores what I call artificial retention’ 
(TT3, p85, emphasis in the original). It seems Stiegler confines intellectual 
capital - not General Intellect - to retentional devices, whereas when Marx 
says the machine works the worker, many times throughout his later work, it 
is clear General Intellect is both a continuation of the deskilling entailed in 
the industrial division of labour, but extending also to bourgeois ideas and 
ruling class circles more generally. In the Daily Tribune of 1861 he writes, ‘the 
progressive division of labor has, to a certain extent, emasculated the general 
intellect of the middle-class men [and women] by the circumscription of all their 
energies and mental faculties within the narrow spheres of their mercantile, 
industrial and professional concerns’.20 The point is that these are the spheres 
of accounting and management, and a continuation, impacted to a ‘certain 
extent’, now increasing. It is a matter of ‘degrees’:
19. Marx and 
Engels, Manifesto, 
op. cit., p87.
20. Karl Marx 
The New-York Daily 
Tribune, 21 October 
1861.
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The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social 
knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, 
hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under 
the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance 
with it.21 
This justly famous passage by Marx is to be updated with a ‘critique’ (Decadence, 
p41) that then becomes Stiegler’s description of the new:
Now a few years into this 21st century, which will be the century of 
nanotechnologies and which will see unheard of relations between 
technics, science and desire, the crucial question of what links and 
distinguishes power, knowledge and the will, i.e., the question of what 
can, at times, set these infinitives into oppositions, composing them 
at the same time, by posing them together, this question which, more 
profoundly and par excellence is the problem of thought and its ass’s 
skin - as though it diagrammed the mechanism of that stupidity Deleuze 
called ‘transcendental’ - this question is a problem for us, so much so as 
to appear to have become unthinkable.22
Stiegler uses the term ‘mnemotechnical retention’ to refer to the ways memory 
and experience are exteriorised. This ‘tertiary’ layer of retention exists as 
material culture into which we are born, into a world not of our own making 
so to speak, though as the exteriorisation and spatialisation of individual time 
becoming collective time, ‘tertiary retention is an original exteriorization of 
mind’ (FNC, p9). Buildings and writing systems, languages and machines, and 
the industrial revolution can all be understood in these terms. In Stiegler’s 
argument the gestures that are, in these systems, increasingly reproduced as 
tertiary retention are either discretised or subject to grammatisation - and 
this is ‘the process of proletarianisation described by Marx and Engels in the 
Communist Manifesto’ (FNC, p11).
 It is Stiegler’s view that new retention technologies, like audio-visual 
recording, unavailable to Marx, constitute new forms of proletarianisation. I 
am convinced that this is important, but think we should ask if Marx did not 
already anticipate this, as well as whether this over-values the ‘new’ in new 
media. We should, instead, ask where the place of agency resides in front of 
machines, including television, but also education, and ‘psychotechnology’, 
and whether, perhaps, the ‘proletariat’ might be less atomised than here 
implied, and also more or less still caught up in a struggle with the market. 
Stiegler rightly warns that the ‘shameful’ charge of economism should not 
mean the political must be purged of economic questions, nor should it mean 
the economic can be ignored in philosophy, nor that urgent questioning be 
left merely to some ‘obsessive relation’ of erudite devotion to philosophical 
economic texts of the past - let us not be too attached to new culturalist 
21. Karl Marx 
Grundrisse, http://
www.marxists.
org/archive/marx/
works/1857/
grundrisse/ch14.
htm - accessed 5 
December 2008.
22. Bernard Stiegler, 
‘Nanomutations, 
Hypomnemata and 
Grammatization’ 
from http://
arsindustrialis.org/
node/2937 - accessed 
5 November 2010.
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texts also. The economic interests of the new media domains might also be 
subject to some older economic questions. The economies of the market and 
the industrial imperative that compels all to adopt the bourgeois mode of 
production, and thus that which ‘sinks’ more and more of social life into the 
proletariat, might be relevant once again. 
 As a counter charge to ‘economism’, we might also wonder if the constant 
recourse to a largely uncritical fascination with new media isn’t also a mirror 
image of such economism, this time as capitulation to the techno-consumerist 
agenda of the gadget corporations. An obsessive relation to the technologies 
of inscription that have seemingly ubiquitous sway. There is room to question 
the imperative built into talk of adoption as a family drama. Again agency 
or the political in terms of collective organisation and resistance needs to be 
thought together with technology (retentions) and economics. This is where it 
is interesting to hear Derrida ask the mock-serious question: what if [mummy-
daddy] Freud had email? He suggests that this would change everything, 
that ‘above all, email’ transforms ‘the entire public and private space of 
humanity’.23 Well, what if Marx had Wordpress, access to CCTV, Skype and 
Ebay? Wasn’t it Marx who said, with Engels, that bourgeois capital offers ‘rapid 
improvement of all instruments of production’ and ‘immensely facilitated 
means of communication’.24  The translation of immensely facilitated from 
the German ‘unendlich erleichterten’25 might be better rendered as ‘infinite 
release’ if we take into account that Marx has in mind not only communications 
in the sense of letters and telegraph, but a ‘feverish velocity’ or ‘fieberhaften 
Geschwindigkeit’,26 of communication as transport and transportation by way 
of ‘a system of river steamers, railways, ocean steamers and telegraphs’ that 
goes beyond anything the manufacturing era could imagine.27
 So, of course we should think not just of writing machines, but it seems 
quite late in the day to be catching up with the realisation that writing orders 
the possible. Nevertheless, Stiegler sees through words:
I call ‘grammatization’ the process whereby the flux and flow networking 
our existences become discreet elements: writing is thus, as the breaking 
into discreet elements of the flux of speech (let us invent the word 
“discretization” for this possibility), a stage in grammatization. Now, the 
process of grammatization, with the dawn of the industrial revolution, 
suddenly surpasses the sphere of language - one wants to say that the same 
thing happened to the sphere of logos - and invades the sphere of the 
body: first and foremost, the gestures of workers, which are discredited, 
devalued in view of their automatic reproduction - while at the same time 
the machines and apparatuses of reproducibilities of the visible and the 
audible appear on the scene.28
Writing here feeds off proletarianisation in so far as this is the process by 
which skills and ways of doing things are transformed by technological 
23. Jacques Derrida, 
Archive Fever, 
Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 
(1995) 1996, p17.
24.  Marx and 
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(1867) 1975, p405.
27. Marx, Capital Vol. 
1, op. cit., p506.
28. Stiegler, 
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developments, for example, with the onset of automated writing tools the 
skill of handwriting recedes into a past, just as is likely the skill of typing 
will cede way to voice recognition - and the carpel tunnel syndrome I have 
developed upon using my Ipad only hastens this evolution. Indeed, carpel 
tunnel is an indication of the future in the same way that sore feet might have 
been a consequence of the loss of hunting grounds and the sedentarisation 
of agricultural society. This is a pretty lame routine and the General Intellect 
is retentional in a more profound way.29 The planned farming day is a 
grammatisation of the walk-all-day lifestyle of the hunter-gatherer nomad - 
scaling up from this gets us to market to market (jiggidy jig) and soon after 
industrial and neo-liberal capitalism.
COMPOSITE WORKER
The key point here is that it is not the - fetishised, digital - convergence of 
things that matters so much as the convergence - as proletarianised labour 
powers - of people. Long ago Marx had already noted that industrial capital 
colonises the brain. His work on cooperation stands as evidence. In chapter 
16 of Capital Volume 1, Marx makes a distinction between productive labour 
and ‘subordinate functions’ that should give educationalists pause: 
a schoolmaster is a productive labourer when, in addition to belabouring 
the heads of his pupils, he works himself into the ground to enrich the 
owner of the school. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching 
factory, instead of in a sausage factory, makes no difference to the relation.30
This is crucial for discussion of the ‘teaching factory’, where academics add 
capacity and help reproduce the productive labourers of the future (their 
students), while oftentimes also producing a ‘surplus’ through fees, consultancy, 
research contracts and the like. This opens a set of strategic problems in need 
of close examination, since the narrative here is never innocent - and again 
I write in a context where massive funding cuts to the University sector join 
the raft of general neo-liberal cutbacks across the sectors. The wider point, 
however, is that Marx is making no strict distinction between manual labour 
and brain labour, between ‘head and hand’. It is ‘the co-operative character 
of the labour process’ that turns the labourer into an ‘organ of the collective 
labourer, and to perform one of its subordinate functions.31 Stiegler’s talk 
of grammatisation is the continuation of the process that entails loss of 
knowledge and know-how that are today transformed into ‘technologies and 
industry’ via the ‘cognitive relational and cultural technologies’ (Decadence, 
p22) under what he calls ‘hypersynchronised’ (p23) and ‘hyperindustrial 
capitalism’ (p130). This is a refined case of where Marx writes: ‘the means 
of production are … changed into means for the absorption of the labour 
of others. It is no longer the worker who employs the means of production, 
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but the means of production that employ the worker’.32 Proletarianisation at 
the level of simple division of labour is only step one of the development of 
a systematic alienation, as elaborated also by Marx in the latter chapters of 
Capital. Stiegler announces,
this grammatization of all the aspects of the human behaviour (intellection, 
motor functions and perception) leads to what is known today as cognitive 
capitalism. [And that] …this cognitive capitalism is also a cultural 
capitalism, which I have analysed elsewhere as a hyperindustrial cognitive 
capitalism.33
Here, I am not sure we have moved much further than chapter 25 of Capital. 
The machines work us, they employ us - they think us too. And with a hint 
at another important aspect of Marx’s commentary on proletarianisation, 
this implies a conscious struggle. Where Marx writes that ‘the worker exists 
to satisfy the need of the existing values for valorization’, an alternative 
possibility would have ‘objective wealth’ made to ‘satisfy the worker’s own 
need for development’ and this is then articulated in terms of head and hand. 
Echoing Feuerbach, Marx writes ‘just as man [sic] is governed, in religion, 
by the products of his[her] own brain, so, in capitalist production, [s]he is 
governed by the products of [her] his own hand’.34 It is here in the intersection 
of Stiegler and Marx that there might be reason to work again at the writing 
machine that renders proletariatisation into prose.
 In this domain, un-thinking must be challenged as discretisation 
infects even the way we un-think education, training, preparation for 
work, television, entertainment, family play, reproduction - all parts of life 
subsumed under commoditisation. Thinking of the teaching factory, we 
might here also wonder at the role of academic and other written modalities 
of surveillance and administration. The intellectual mechanisation that is 
reduced to governmentality, the management of work and non-work - the 
lumpenproletariat, the reserve army of labour - the training programs and 
reproduction are also the alienated provenance of this separation of mind and 
hand. A vast integrated convoluted cognitive machinery, of which the culture 
industry is not merely a covering apparatus and component. Training and 
shopping and recorded music: never co-constituted in alienated thinking; 
never components of a co-operative grammar, to come ...
 Is it unthinkable to undo this nexus of head and hand, finger and dial, 
university and state, intellect and war, scholarship and capital? Stiegler has 
opened up a possible avenue of inquiry that tackles such problems, and where 
we are capable of noting also that attention marketing requires complicit 
academic agents, this is of course a dangerous - pharmaka - terrain. Attention-
marketing requires product review, exclusivity/exclusion and an undisclosed 
delusional god-complex that would have the critical critic declared as the 
only one able to see the proclamations of self-awareness that would not 
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reflect on institutional or industry positioning. Stiegler can hardly be said to 
ignore the escalating context that would link the family and play to the school 
and training, to the cultural industries and to the global financial markets, 
but, although implicit, it seems such connections are not consistently or 
explicitly related to Marx and Engels’ still wider notion of proletarianisation 
as conscious struggle. Nevertheless, he does underline the connection where 
the financial or marketised context is one in which:
our existences are now deeply implicated in networks of specialized 
technolological information of which we are largely (unavoidably?) 
ignorant, yet which force us to delegate our futures to the firms and 
agencies that then delegate them to markets. This is the context in 
which the service economy ‘produces’ dissociation - the destruction 
of associational media through development of psychotechnologies 
eradicating psychic and social faculties (particularly attention), replacing 
them with automata stripped of any reinteriorization process; that is, 
without critique, and thus without responsibility (TC, p134).
CRETINISATION
To change the tone of this narrative somewhat, this penultimate section 
explores more explicit biographical and political investments in time. The 
move to consider attention marketing emerges, I argue, from autobiographical-
theoretical thinking in Stiegler’s shortest book, Acting Out. Stiegler describes 
his experience of incarceration in prison in curious terms: incarceration 
entailed a separation from the world that allowed him to contemplate his 
milieu ‘as does a flying fish, above his element’ (AO, p15). Certainly not your 
average jailbird, Stiegler plunged into a philosophical menagerie, with only 
animals for company. Elsewhere he talks of a ‘flock of parrots’, meaning those 
who ‘ape’ the chatter of digital ideology (Decadence, p5). When he writes of 
the radio, television, internet and audiovisual electronic technologies that 
engender repetitive behaviour, this is a ‘herd’ in Nietzsche’s sense (AO, p48, 
my emphasis) or ‘becoming herdish’ (Decadence, p53, 56). And throughout 
Technics and Time there is an eagle picking away at Prometheus’ liver, ticking 
away the recurrent hours.35
 Animals and time become interesting when Stiegler suggests that the 
crisis of capitalism is a collapse that occurs through short termism, with 
the time of knowledge and of investment erased, and proletarianization of 
retention meaning an extensive loss of knowledge. Capital is ‘a dynamic system 
threatened by a limit that would be reached if the bearish tendency to which the 
very functioning of the profit rate gives rise were to achieve completion’ (FNC, 
p75, my emphasis). These are not bears asleep in caves, but rather short-term 
rogue traders - metaphorically beastly animals roaming the financial woods, 
only occasionally in hibernation. But every time the bear appears Stiegler 
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also tends to tell us about something of which Marx was ‘unaware’ (FNC, 
p88) - in this case marketing, but in others it is always a new and unforeseen 
response of capital in America and so forth. For Stiegler, the proletarianised 
consumer’s libidinal energy is a new energy that Marx could not anticipate, 
even where Marx discusses consumption as productive (Decadence, p64). For 
Stiegler the capitalist system is bearish or fictitiously speculative, and Marx 
failed to take this ‘fully into account’ (FNC, p89). The key to Stiegler’s thinking 
here is that the rate of profit no longer has to do with a credit crisis, but is 
rather the consequence of a culture of corruption, where capital becomes 
‘Mafia-esque’ and a dominant, and Freud-esque, ‘consumption-drive’ is no 
longer to be understood in relation to the equation P equals surplus over 
constant and variable cost of production, that is ‘a profit that no longer bears 
any relation to the profit rate calculated by ...’ Marx (FNC, p92). This form 
of capitalism ‘cannot be thought with Marxist concepts alone’ (p87). The new 
economy associates the present milieu of capitalism with a stupidity that is 
the proletarianisation of the nervous system.
 Stiegler’s discussion of stupidity is key to his understanding of the 
contemporary psychotechnological predicament and gives an insight into 
what is at stake in the parameters he sets. There are three questions he poses 
in the ‘battle for intelligence’:
The first [question] requires asking oneself about the intelligence that is 
required to ask about intelligence. 
The second consists of knowing why it is necessary to engage in the battle 
for intelligence.
The third and last requirement for any contemporary battle of and for 
intelligence in the struggle of and with technologies of intelligence, in which 
psychotechnologies that might produce stupidity by destroying attention 
transform into the technologies of an individual and collective intelligence 
whose aim is to constitute a social (political) apparatus for unifying all social 
apparatuses, the economic, juridical, educational, scientific, artistic and 
cultural (as well as the medical) and those focusing on society’s protection, 
such as internal and external security, and so on (TC, p30-31). 
The last of these is not expressed as a question so much as a problem area, but 
the iteration is particularly interesting - the repetition of ‘of and for’, ‘of and 
with’ and the list and commas and after the clause, ‘and so on’. It might be 
suggested that this cascade indicates a point of tension, and this precisely in 
relation to security, society’s protection, which is also to say, in contemporary 
terms, the consequences of the war of terror. Or might we say, the war ‘of and 
for, of and with, and, and’ terror. 
 We are not, however, talking here of the kind of political mobilisation Marx 
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and Engels had in mind. Cretinisation and an ‘auto-cretinising’ of social life 
produced by the unregulated power of the media monopolies is, strangely, 
‘also and indeed first of all a question of the responsibility of our political 
representatives, above all those who are not simply political representatives 
but have executive power’ (TC, p90). Stiegler then calls upon Sarkozy. The 
problem is not the mute leadership, which is of course in the pay of capital as 
the executive class of the bourgeoisie, any more than it is the irresponsibility 
of allegedly patronising intellectuals who think that the masses are no 
more than dupes, while being equally duped by the trappings of power 
themselves. Again, ‘the misuse of psychotechnologies can have catastrophic 
effects on juvenile consciousness. Our political representatives, particularly 
those in power, are thus faced with exceptional responsibilities’ (TC, p190). 
Disregarding any ‘cognitive overflow syndrome’ or attention deficit, Stiegler 
then again calls upon Sarkozy, this time alongside Al Gore, to fight against 
psychopower (TC, p191).
 It is here that psychopower is to be placed ‘under constraints’ (TC, p191), 
yet these constraints remain quite abstract. I would say this tends towards 
impotence when Stiegler suggests that the ‘surrender to machines’ leads to 
a ‘short-circuiting of psychosocial transindividuation - of the generations 
as well as social classes and territory’ (TC, p152). It is always dangerous to 
locate problems in the mixed metaphors of cartography and show jumping, 
but Stiegler does not think it impossible to ‘correct our course’ even if ‘many 
obstacles stand in our way: in the first place, a veritable conspiracy of imbeciles’ 
which is also a ‘conspiracy of inattention’ (TC, p87). This correction, which is a 
‘weighty task’ and ‘par excellence today’s political responsibility’ is something 
that ‘belongs firstly to those whom one calls “intellectuals” … thinkers, savants, 
artists, philosophers’ (Decadence, p145).
 It may seem stupid to refuse to concede, but as teaching - from cradle, 
to school, to factory or office - is about paying attention, endlessly, might it 
not be worth the experimental suggestion that there could be another kind 
of organisation and another kind of time? Let us take our time with this. 
A non-clock time that tampered with the expectations of clockwork and 
machines, and thereby with attention, might at least not be so quick to make 
the equation of long-circuit as good, short-circuit as bad. For Stiegler, time 
‘is completely singular’ and with television ‘one actually has the feeling that 
it is impossible to stop’.36 The eagle pecking daily at Prometheus’s liver is the 
carrion beast of clock regulation. As has often been pointed out, the clock has 
been a device used to trick workers into conceding their labour power, and 
now we can see also their ‘brain time’, to the capitalist for less than its value. 
Against this is the intentionally stupid insistence that it might be possible to 
imagine that there are many and multiple nows, simultaneous short-circuits 
and long-circuits, multiplying, sometimes good, sometimes bad. This may 
even be called dialectics - co-constituting and interactive, perhaps sometimes 
interchangeable, or reversible, circuits of time, and we - as subjectivities, trans-
36. Stiegler, in 
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individuations of individual workers - are unable to access this abundance 
of time except as unthinkable, counterfactual, delinquent provocation. We 
perhaps approximate this thinking in the mad chaos of co-operation, and 
even in solidarity - workers of the world unite! - or perhaps in the planned 
economy or in hope for the future. Whatever the case, we do not yet think 
this together, as Marx, I think, suggests we do. 
 It should be clear I think that Marx, in Capital Volume 2,37 is on a somewhat 
different track than Stiegler, in that he thinks multiple times of circulation 
and simultaneous circuits - many and multiple circuits - of capitalism - not 
just production, circulation and consumption, as these too are a multiple 
dialectic. His cognition is transindividual for sure, but as an internationalist, 
systemic and multi-located, integrated, uneven, complicated, diversified 
in unity, thinking of the world - where I am not separate, but connected, 
through choice, even if I cannot grasp this as yet. It is just here we might try 
to think - from now - that which links and distinguishes a political struggle 
over power, knowledge and will.
 Is Stiegler more worried about time than he should be? Taking care 
would require long-circuits of attention such as that which Dan Ross usefully 
illustrates with reference to the formation of taste as opposed to the satisfaction 
of hunger.38 The trouble is that this entails a polarisation of hunger and taste 
appreciation that may not stand up in practice. The forms of labour that 
prevail in contemporary capitalism are many and varied, often mediated no 
doubt, and variously subject to interruption, relay and redoublings. What 
can be asserted is that there is now a trend towards more diverse forms of 
family, community and association than could be known in the bourgeois 
European family of nineteenth century industrial Britain, and probably this 
is a good thing. But I am not sure that the circuits here are thought through 
as carefully as they might be. 
 Let this be made clear: for Stiegler, a long-circuit means the use of technical 
prostheses to produce transindividual knowledge and desire, whereas short-
circuit refers to the passive fulfilment of drives such as vigilance.39 There is no 
guarantee that long or deep attention doesn’t also hand us over to convergence 
and hyper synchronised grammatical microtechnology. If proletarianisation 
extends to all, not just the working class, because consumption became a 
necessary component of cultural control - as Adorno understood - so as to 
respond to contradictions in capital - that Marx did not understand, says 
Stiegler - and this today threatens destruction, then we are in trouble if only 
‘intellectuals’ can save us with long division. I am concerned that the anxiety 
expressed in the face of a consumerist, and indeed the theorist’s, scramble 
to respond to the convergence of new media has elevated a conception of 
reproduction of memory and meaning, located and alienated in technologies 
of tertiary retention, while relegating possibilities that do not rely upon calling 
on Sarkozy or ‘intellectuals’ for political representation. There is a question 
here - ‘impotence’ (Decadence, p60) - that renders the scene decadent when 
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perhaps we should look more closely at the kind of family and convergence we 
might want to adopt or which is to hand, in Heidegger’s sense. For example, 
Stiegler does not address reproductive labour, or cohesive work for moral(ity), 
community or nation, insofar as these too are collective efforts and many 
timed narrations. The rather undifferentiated concept of the long-circuit 
does not do enough to get at this. Long and durable ‘duration’ replaced by 
the new means a loss that it would be tempting to caricature as a fear of senile 
very late capitalism: queuing for Medicare and pensions while the shaking 
invisible hand of the market grips the virtual zimmer frame of instability. 
Can a more nuanced model of time, labour and technology be released on 
the back of Stiegler’s analysis?
 There are several symptoms that indicate such - pharmacological - 
treatment in theoretical discussions within the academy. For example, the 
speed-hype that exercises the likes of Paul Virilio40 and Derrida;41 let us call 
these acceleration-valorisation theorists, and those that anticipate ‘cognitive 
overload’, a kind of fear of information-glut. Both positions line up alongside a 
somewhat senile cretinisation that would merely gawk at the discombobulation 
of very late capitalism, continually checking to see if it has its bus-pass, if 
its papers are in order, if it has not lost its keys or left the gas on - there is a 
suggestion in all this that the mode of production now passing is a permanent 
state of decay in those that would hang on for grim death should be prised 
off the handle - or steering wheel, rudder, or anchor? Does it not sound like 
anxiety about youth when we read ‘the central question for the media world’ 
is now that of ‘control of youth’s psychic and social apparatuses from the 
youngest age, despite its destruction of the intergenerational circuitry’? (TC, 
p132)
FOR A NEW CRITIQUE
 
The work of forming attention undertaken by the family, the school, the 
totality of teaching and cultural institutions, and all the apparatuses of 
‘spiritual value’ (beginning with academic apparatuses) is systematically 
undone by the effort to produce a consumer stripped of the ability to be 
autonomous either morally or cognitively - to have consciousness as free 
will, without which there can be no ‘science’ that is not ruinous (TC, p184).
Stiegler’s ruination is located in the schools and the family but these spaces 
are not thought through in terms of the politics of proletarianisation as 
conceived by Marx to stem from the ‘sinking’ of more and more workers into 
the wage relation, and even - we have work to do here to address an imbalance 
- reproductive labour that itself becomes proletarianised. It is certainly the 
case that the production of consumers is at play here, but a survey might 
find forms of proletarian work that might still need attention - sex work, 
cleaning, bringing up children: all industrialised in the service and affective 
40. Paul Virilio, 
Speed and Politics, 
New York, 
Semiotext(e), 1977.
41. Derrida, Archive 
Fever, op. cit.
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economy.42 Reproduction, community, morality and citizenship are four key 
areas of contribution to long-term social and productive life that remain 
largely outside the calculus of waged labour. That these areas of contribution 
are made over time and rendered increasingly visible through attachments 
to commodities is no surprise. The washing machine or cooker, the clothing 
or songs of an ethnic identity, even where hybridised, the daily newspaper 
or a bookshelf full of improving literature or a valid passport with visa entry 
stamp are all calculable commodity forms, the disciplining of life through 
a monetarisation that we cannot not want acknowledged. As Stiegler writes,
there is nothing inevitable requiring that time (attention) be captured and 
monopolized in young brains by marketing, nor that this process should 
result in the systematic deprivation of consciousness, to the point that it 
might become literally impossible to (re)educate those organologically 
conditioned brains that have become prone to incivility or delinquency. Nor 
is it inevitable that older brains, subject to the same conditions, should 
find themselves deprived of all responsibility; that is, of their capacity to 
oppose such conditions (TC, p35, my emphasis).
This is why the discussion of education was important. Stiegler does not think 
it impossible to imagine ‘an alternative model’ where the ‘tools required for a 
life in hyperindustrial societies’ might emerge via an ‘appropriate [adoptive] 
education system’ - though he notes that this ‘might be a utopian vision … 
completing the process of what I have called generalized proletarianization’ 
(TC, p97).  
 There is the possibility of going further here, to proletarianise it all, and 
taking up Marx’s nuanced consideration of proletarianisation in a wider 
sense, suggesting that what is called incivility and delinquency are indeed the 
opposition, or at least a part of, and beginning of, an organised resistance 
to that which would reduce all of life to marketing controls. Consider all the 
ways the family, nation, migration, economy - privatised, end of welfare, 
education - utilitarian, commoditised - and war, including urban security 
and terror anxiety, have transformed the space of bourgeois society since the 
advent of neoliberal capitalism. With the public debate, such as it is, focused 
on parenting and a decline of respect for old family values, in Britain at 
least, then a Marxist interpretation of the present crisis should not stop with 
a diagnosis of ruin. The recognition of delinquency and incivility are not 
enough, and we may need rather more delinquents, and considerable civil 
unrest, before a revolutionary call to attention gains ground. The danger of 
the attention-capture diagnosis of the ‘current politics’ renders the masses 
passive too readily and ignores the Marxist content of proletarianisation 
as originally set out by Marx and Engels: the advent of a political struggle 
on the way towards a new world where ‘the free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all’.43
42. What is difficult 
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  So when Stiegler calls for a new critique of political economy, as we 
have seen, he does this with a judgemental and simple notion of time and 
without a concept of praxis or revolutionary party activism. In Technics and 
Time, Taking Care, For a New Critique of Political Economy and The Decadence 
of Industrial Democracies at least, he has very little to say about class or social 
conflict, nor ventures any effort to understand how class composition must 
be updated in ways that can also learn from Marx and the notion of the 
General Intellect which already maps out the composite worker. Stiegler’s 
impressively nuanced analysis of digital retention shows how writing is 
part of the new composite class formation of a ‘new’ proletariat who are also 
media literate. Here where universal education was the nineteenth Century 
deal, we are now collectivised through gadgets. But there is no appreciation 
of how the proletarianised consumer must and does confront these gadgets 
as machines also in class terms.
 Stiegler and Ars Industrialis update the notion of proletarianisation for 
contemporary times but in doing so they underplay the two key dimensions 
of Marx and Engels’ conception that follow on from step one. In focussing on 
loss of skill and knowledge, ceded to the televisual and information systems, 
the immiseration that results from ‘sinking’ into the exploitation of waged 
labour - nowadays also brain-labour - and the mobilisations resultant from 
such abjection are minimised or ignored. In this context, the stupidity of 
delinquents is condemned and childishness, bearishness misconstrued. Does 
Stiegler not see that stupidity too can be pharmacological? The point is that 
Marx’s notion of proletarianisation has three components and very often 
the third is left aside in the too hard basket. The work of labour that creates 
community - transindividuation, is also done in mediated form and perhaps 
even through ruinous modes of engagement with media and work formats. 
The immediate circuits may involve unpaid labour, brain-power, attention 
or being often captured, often exploited, often disassociated, but is also 
often expended in exuberant, rampant, excessive and - is it so unthinkable 
- proto-revolutionary ways. Mao said, apropos the ‘riff raff ’, that he does 
not agree with those who claim the revolting peasants go too far when they 
band together to destroy the bourgeoisie do not share his view. He praises 
their action in the circumstances, and will not criticise them by muttering ‘it 
is terrible’, as so many others do.44
 Stiegler’s argument is that the televisual system captures the attention 
of youth and destroys the long-circuit of care of family and education. It is 
certainly true that transformations are underway, but it may be that we need 
to think of the durations of transformation with an understanding of time, 
engagement and politics that offers a still longer conception of duration, or 
a multiple and non-linear notion of time. There may be concurrent longer-
circuits of class composition that are relevant here, or even multiple-circuits 
of engagement and transformation that can be more subtly evaluated - as 
not necessarily ‘too bad’ or ‘all good’. Stiegler does open up these directions 
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even where he does not follow the Marx of volumes two and three of Capital 
and of The Poverty of Philosophy45 which might extend his argument. 
Marx’s thinking on the circuits of capital might suggest dialectical readings of 
several non-commensurate, simultaneous circuits of finance/credit, production 
and consumption - division one and division two, productive consumption, 
credit, the tendential decline - that could then be brought to the discussion 
of family and education to complicate our evaluations. If there are several 
possible long and short circuits of, for example, ruin, riff raff, or of televisual/
cultural industry inattention, then capture is not the only or necessary or 
limiting consequence. We have seen this and know also that television can 
solicit deep attention, why not grant the possibility that these forms have a 
role in progressive political transformation as well?
Lenin, to pick an explicitly ‘delinquent’ case, argued that the Party had to 
use the most advanced modes of communication in making its struggle 
known.46 The Soviets need not only electrification and Pravda, but have to 
express the revolutionary project in whatever means are available, in order 
to both communicate through and transform these media. The revolutionary 
project is another form of care of course, with a longer circuit perhaps than 
family and educational institutions, but also aiming to transform these, to 
sublate the things that capitalism brings in ways that are not exploitative nor 
oppressive. The old mole grubs up again over long cycles, as Marx noted. 
Mao too wrote much on the care that the revolutionary army must take in 
its work with the mass peasantry;47 there is something here too to consider 
in terms of another circuit, an involvement in national and international 
communism that must itself be patient, especially, perhaps, with philosophy. 
These are however topics for a different paper.
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